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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Tarango Deforest Padilla appeals from the district court's order denying 
his petition for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The Idaho Court of Appeals described the facts underlying Padilla's 
criminal convictions as follows: 
At approximately 2:30 a.m. one morning in August 2009, 
Officer Matthew Gonzales, who was on routine patrol driving 
through an alley, saw Padilla and attempted to make contact with 
him. Padilla fled and was subsequently found nearby lying on the 
ground under a tree. During a search of Padilla, officers found two 
financial transaction cards (cards) that did not belong to Padilla and 
several spark plug pieces.[FN] Officers found additional cards, 
spark plug pieces, and a flashlight upon searching the area where 
Padilla was pursued and ultimately detained. Police contacted the 
owners of two of the cards, who both confirmed they left their cards 
in their respective unlocked vehicles the night before and the cards 
were missing. Both victims denied knowing Padilla or giving him 
permission to use the cards. 
Padilla was charged with two counts of grand theft, Idaho 
Code §§ 18-2403( 1), 18-2407 ( 1 )(b), and with being a persistent 
violator, I.C. § 19-2514, in separate cases later consolidated for 
trial. ... 
The jury found Padilla guilty as charged. 
FN. Officer Gonzales testified at trial that from his training, 
he was aware that ceramic spark plug pieces are often used 
by criminals to easily break car windows. He testified he did 
not know of any legitimate reason a person would have such 
items on his person. 
State v. Padilla, Docket Nos. 38899-38900, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 777 
at p.2 (Idaho App. Dec. 28, 2012). 
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Padilla filed a pro se petition for post-conviction in cases 
alleged, among other claims, that his attorney was ineffective for failing to file a 
motion to suppress. (R., pp.13-21, 191-199.) Padilla also filed a motion 
appointment of counsel, which the district court granted. (R., pp.22-26, 200-204.) 
The court thereafter notified Padilla of its intent to dismiss his petition. (R., 
pp.27-28, 205-206.) With respect to Padilla's claim that counsel was ineffective 
for failing to file a suppression motion, the court advised Padilla that he failed to 
identify, in his petition, any basis for suppression. (R., pp.27, 205.) In response, 
Padilla, with the assistance of counsel, filed an amended petition. (R., pp.46-49, 
53-58, 232-237.) In his amended petition, Padilla alleged, in relevant part, that 
counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress, which motion he 
asserted should have been based on an allegedly illegal "Terry stop" and 
statements "made to police without a Miranda warning." (R., pp.54, 233.) The 
state filed an answer and a separate motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.59-
61, 70-90, 238-241, 252-273.) The state also filed a motion to take judicial notice 
of several documents related to Padilla's underlying criminal cases, as did 
Padilla. 1 (R., pp.67-69 (state's motion), 94-141 (Padilla's motion and 
attachments), 146-148 (state's amended motion).) 
Although the state requested summary dismissal, the court did not rule on 
that motion but instead conducted an evidentiary hearing at which Padilla 
withdrew his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to 
1 At the outset of the evidentiary hearing, the court addressed the parties' request 
for judicial notice and ultimately admitted the documents that were the subject of 
the parties' motions as exhibits. (Tr., p.5, L.21 - p.8, L.4.) 
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suppress based on Miranda, but maintained his claim that suppression should 
have been sought based on the alleged absence of reasonable articulable 
suspicion to support his detention as required under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968). (Tr., p.15, L.24 - p.16, L.9.) After the hearing, the court entered a 
written decision denying relief and a separate Judgment dismissing Padilla's 
petition. (R., pp.154-165, 288-299.) Padilla filed a timely notice of appeal. 2 (R., 
pp.167-169, 301-302.) 
2 Although technically two separate cases, Padilla's single petition filed in relation 
to both underlying criminal cases was litigated in the same proceeding and t~ 
cases have been consolidated on appeal. (R., pp.177-178, 314-315; Tr., p.5, 
Ls.13-14 (court noting that the cases were "set for hearing at the same time on 
the docket because they are companion cases".) 
3 
ISSUE 
states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in denying post-conviction relief given that 
Mr. Padilla's trial counsel was ineffective in not filing a motion to suppress 
evidence obtained in violation of the state and federal constitutions? Idaho 
Const. Art. I,§§ 13 and 17; U.S. Const. Amends. 4, 6, 14. 
(Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Padilla failed to show error in the district court's denial of his petition 
for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing? 
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ARGUMENT 
Padilla Has Failed To Show Error In the District Court's Denial Of His Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief Following An Evidentiary Hearing 
A. Introduction 
Padilla contends the district court erred in denying post-conviction relief 
because, he argues, he "did establish both deficient performance and prejudice" 
related to counsel's failure to file a suppression motion. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-
7.) Padilla is incorrect. Application of the correct legal standards to the evidence 
presented at the hearing shows Padilla failed to meet his burden of showing he 
was entitled to relief. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Applications for post-conviction relief under the UPCPA initiate civil 
proceedings in which, like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove his or her 
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 
567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) (citing Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 
838,172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007); I.C.R. 57(c)). 
When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings 
of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of 
law drawn by the district court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 27 4, 
276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998). A trial court's decision that a post-
conviction petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight. 
Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990). 
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credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, 
and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within 
of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 
110 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. Padilla Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishing Counsel V'Jas 
Ineffective For Failing To File A Suppression Motion 
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-
conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting 
prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. 
Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,137,774 P.2d 299,307 (1989). With respect to the 
deficient performance prong, the United States Supreme Court has articulated 
the defendant's burden under Strickland as follows: 
To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a 
conviction must show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. A court considering a claim 
of ineffective assistance must apply a strong presumption that 
counsel's representation was within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. The challenger's burden is to show that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (citations and quotations 
omitted). 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 787. "A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 19..:. (citations 
and quotations omitted). When a post-conviction petitioner claims his counsel 
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was ineffective for failing file a motion in his underlying criminal case, the court 
"may consider the probability of success of the motion in question in determining 
whether the attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent performance." Sanchez 
v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 713, 905 P.2d 642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995); see also 
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) ("Where defend counsel's 
failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal 
allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth 
Amendment claim is meritorious .... "). "Where the alleged deficiency is 
counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would 
not have been granted by the trial court, is generally determinative of both prongs 
of the test." Sanchez, 127 Idaho at 713, 905 P.2d at 646. "If the motion lacked 
merit and would have been denied, counsel ordinarily would not be deficient for 
failing to pursue it, and, concomitantly, the petitioner could not have been 
prejudiced by the want of his pursuit." kt 
In his Amended Petition Padilla alleged: 
Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a motion to 
suppress. 
This is based upon an illegal Terry stop . . .. The officer's 
vehicle appeared as if it were going to run Defendant down and so 
Defendant ran from the vehicle. This did not create a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity that would rise to the level of allowing 
a stop and frisk. Additionally, the behavior of Defendant was 
caused by the actions of the officers. 
The attorney for Defendant did not file a motion to suppress. 
If he had then Defendant would not have been stopped and frisked 
and would not have been arrested and therefore would not have 
had to face trial. 
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(R., pp.54, 233.) 
In his Affidavit in Support of Complaint filed in Padilla's criminal case, 
which was admitted as Exhibit 2 at the evidentiary hearing, Officer Gonzales 
averred, in relevant part: 
On 08/07/2009, at approximately 0232 hours, I was traveling 
eastbound in the alley between 5th Avenue East and 6th Avenue 
East in the 400 black. As I was driving I noticed a male walking 
southbound on Ketchum Street. When the male noticed my 
marked police vehicle he started running. I got out of my vehicle 
and yelled for the male to stop running. The male continued 
running and was jumping fences during this time I was yelling for 
him to stop running. The male, identified as Tarango Deforest 
Padilla, was later caught laying [sic] in some bushes at the 
intersection of 5th Avenue East and Blue Lakes Boulevard, in the 
City and County of Twin falls, state of Idaho. Padilla was detained 
until it could be determined why he had run. In a search of the area 
where the male was lying, I located two financial transaction cards 
and $458.00 dollars. Also laying [sic] in the area were some small 
ceramic pieces of a spark plug, which through my training and 
experience as a police officer I identified as a tool used to easily 
break vehicle windows. More ceramic pieces of the spark plug 
were located in Padilla's jacket pocket. I know these items are 
often used to burglarize vehicles. All of the items that were located 
in the bushes were clean and appeared to have just been placed 
there. A search of Padilla's person produced 15 peach colored pills 
with Watson 3203 stamped on it. These pills were identified using 
the Drug Bible as Hydrocodone Biturate, which is a schedule Ill 
controlled substance. The pills were not in a prescription bottle and 
Padilla did not have a prescription for the pills. Two other financial 
transaction cards were also located on Padilla's person. A small 
red flashlight was located in one of the yards that I chased Padilla 
through. 
(Exhibit 2, p.2.) 
Officer Gonzales arrested Padilla and, after transporting him to the jail, he 
was "informed that Padilla had a warrant out of Twin Falls County Jail." (Exhibit 
2, p.2.) Upon being told he would also be "booked on the warrant[,] Padilla 
stated that was the reason that he ran in the first place." (Exhibit 2, p.2.) 
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Officer Gonazles testified in similar fashion at Padilla's preliminary 
hearing, providing further details regarding Padilla's evasive actions, testifying 
that Padilla entered the alley, "stopped, fumbled around for a minute, and then 
started to come out of the alley and began to walk again," then "looked at" Officer 
Gonazles' "clearly marked patrol vehicle" and "turned and started running." 
(Exhibit 6, p.10, Ls.1-8.) Officer Gonzales also added that he was unable to 
identify Padilla after he located him because Padilla was "unwilling to provide 
information on his name." (Exhibit 6, p.9, L.10 - p.13, L.3.) At the jail, however, 
jail deputies "were able to identify [Padilla] and gave [Officer Gonzales] a name." 
(Exhibit 6, p.13, Ls.4-13.) 
Nothing in Officer Gonazles' affidavit or subsequent preliminary hearing 
testimony establishes error in counsel's failure to seek suppression based on an 
allegedly unlawful detention. It is well-settled that a police officer may, in 
compliance with the Fourth Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an 
individual if that officer entertains a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is 
underway. State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 896, 821 P.2d 949, 951 (1991); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The "reasonable suspicion" standard is an 
objective test that is satisfied if law enforcement can articulate specific facts 
which, along with the reasonable inferences from those facts, justify the 
suspicion that the person detained is or has been involved in criminal activity. 
State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 408, 973 P.2d 758, 760 (Ct. App. 1999); 
Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896-897, 821 P.2d at 951-952. Reasonable suspicion is 
a less demanding standard than probable cause. Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896, 
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821 P.2d at 951. Although a series of facts may appear innocent when viewed 
separately, they may warrant further investigation when together. State v. 
Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
Under the totality of the circumstances and based on Officer Gonzales' 
training and experience and appropriate inferences, there was reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that Padilla had been involved in criminal activity. In Illinois 
v. Wardlaw, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000), the Supreme Court aptly noted: 
"Headlong flight-wherever it occurs-is the consummate act of evasion: It is 
not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such." 
Thus, while an individual undoubtedly has "a right to ignore the police and go 
about his business" when an officer approaches and doing so does not provide a 
justification for a detention or seizure, "unprovoked flight is simply not a mere 
refusal to cooperate. Flight, by its very nature, is not 'going about one's 
business'; in fact, it is just the opposite." Wardlaw, 528 U.S. at 125. "Allowing 
officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate further is 
quite consistent with the individual's right to go about his business or to stay put 
and remain silent in the face of police questioning." kt 
After lurking in the alley at 2:30 in the morning, and upon noticing Officer 
Gonzales' patrol car, Gonzales fled - unprovoked. Although Officer Gonzales 
was going to attempt to make contact with Padilla after seeing him in the alley, 
Officer Gonzales did not detain Gonzales for purposes of the Fourth Amendment 
until after Gonzales' unprovoked "headlong flight" and subsequent discovery of 
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him hiding in the bushes. 3 See State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587, 593, 903 P.2d 
752, 758 (Ct App. 1995) (an individual is not seized until he submits to law 
enforcement's show of authority). "[C]ommonsense judgments and inferences 
about human behavior" gave Officer Gonazles reasonable suspicion to detain 
Padilla and confirm or dispel any suspicion that he has been engaged in criminal 
activity. Wardlaw, 528 U.S. at 125 (citation omitted). 
Padilla acknowledges that "commonsense judgments and inferences 
about human behavior" are relevant to the determination of reasonable 
suspicion, but claims nothing about his act of flight was suspicious because, he 
believes, it "seems a perfectly logical response by any pedestrian walking alone 
at night when a previously darkened car suddenly begins driving toward the 
walker from an alleyway." (Appellant's Brief, pp.7, 9.) One of the flaws in 
Padilla's argument is that Padilla turned and looked at Officer Gonzales exiting 
his clearly marked patrol car, and then fled. (Exhibit 15, p.73, Ls.14-23.) 
Moreover, Padilla's supposedly "innocent" explanation for his behavior is not only 
irrelevant to whether it could be considered to inform whether Officer Gonzales 
had reasonable articulable suspicion, Brumfield, supra, it is inconsistent with 
Padilla's own testimony that he hid in the bushes and wanted to make sure he 
"didn't have nothing [sic] on [him] in case [he] got found" because he "had a 
misdemeanor warrant for a misdemeanor DUI at that time also, so [he] was 
3 In his brief, Padilla notes that he "entered the alley way where Officer Gonzales 
was parked with the car lights off. Officer Gonzales turned on the lights and 
began driving toward Mr. Padilla and Mr. Padilla ran." (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) To 
be clear, Officer Gonzales turned on his headlights, not his overhead lights. 
(Exhibit 15, p.73, Ls.11-13.) 
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panicking" and he idn't want to pick up more because [he] thought 
[he] might have had some weed on [him]," so he "tossed everything that [he] 
thought he didn't want found on [him] into the bushes." (Tr., p.41, L.25 - p.42, 
L.9.) Officer Gonzales undoubtedly perceived precisely what Padilla admitted -
panicky behavior by someone who was engaged in criminal conduct. Padilla's 
entire behavior, from walking in and out of the alley at 2:30 in the morning, to 
fleeing when he saw Officer Gonzales, to emptying his pockets and hiding in the 
bushes was more than adequate to give Officer Gonzales reasonable articulable 
suspicion to detain him. Padilla's claim to the contrary fails. Therefore, his claim 
that counsel was deficient for failing to file a motion to suppress also fails 
because such a motion would have been denied. For this same reason, Padilla 
cannot show prejudice. 
Padilla complains that "the district court circumvented the Terry problem 
by stating that the police would have had the right to arrest [him] on his warrant 
and search him incident to arrest." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Padilla contends the 
court's "analysis is flawed because the police officers did not learn of the warrant 
until after the unconstitutional search had been completed - not until Mr. Padilla 
was at the jail being booked." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) The Idaho Supreme 
Court has applied the intervening circumstances test in determining whether 
evidence found pursuant to a valid arrest on a warrant is sufficiently attenuated 
from an unlawful seizure immediately preceding the arrest. State v. Page, 140 
Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d 454, 459 (2004). This Court need not engage in such 
an analysis because, although the district court did not conduct a Terry analysis, 
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that does not preclude this Court from affirming based on the correct conclusion 
that Officer Gonzales had reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Padilla -
and to arrest and search him based on the evidence discovered at the time of the 
seizure. See Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123 
Idaho 573, 580, 850 P.2d 724, 731 (1993) ("where an order of the district court is 
correct but based upon an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm upon the 
correct theory"). 
Because a suppression motion based on an alleged Terry violation would 
not have been granted, Padilla failed to prove counsel was ineffective for failing 
to file such a motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
judgment dismissing Padilla's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 11 th day of June, 2014. 
/JE9'SICA M. LORELLO 
~puty Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11 th day of June, 201 I caused two 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRI OF RESPONDENT to be placed in 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
DEBORAH WHIPPLE 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT 
303 West Bannock 
PO Box 83701 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
JML/pm 
I 
Attorney General 
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